

Message Text

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ORIGIN DEAE-00

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 INR-07 JUSE-00

NSAE-00 SNM-02 SY-04 TRSE-00 USIA-06 NSC-05 OES-03

OMB-01 AID-05 AGR-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-02 /080 R

DRAFTED BY DEA:JCUASC:DEMILLER:BB

APPROVED BY S/NM:SBVANCE

EUR/SE:BHIRSHORN

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P R 120029Z FEB 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 031503

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SNAR

SUBJECT: UN TURKISH CONTROL PROGRAM -- EQUIPMENT AND PLANS

CHECK LIST

1. FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED US MISSION GENEVA TO BE MADE
AVAILABLE AS APPROPRIATE TO MEMBERS UN MISSION TO
TURKEY, FROM DEA.

2. IN SEPTEMBER 1968, \$3.0 MILLION US AID PROJECT LOAN
NO. 277-H-086 FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONTROL
WAS SIGNED. PURPOSE WAS TO STRENGTHEN GOT ABILITY TO
GRADUALLY ELIMINATE OPIUM POPPY PRODUCTION AND IMPROVE
LAW ENFORCEMENT CONTROLS IN COURSE OF DOING SO. TOTAL
OF \$1.6 MILLION WAS PROVIDED MIN. AGRICULTURE FOR
AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENTAL AND RESEARCH EQUIPMENT, PLUS
150 FOUR WHEEL DRIVE PICKUP TRUCKS AND 10 HEAVIER
VEHICLES. THE PICKUP TRUCKS WERE FOR AGRICULTURAL
EXTENSION AGENTS TO FACILITATE THEIR WORK IN CROP
SUBSTITUTION AND CONTROL OF POPPY PRODUCTION WHERE IT
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REMAINED LEGAL. ONE VEHICLE WAS TO BE ASSIGNED TO EACH
DISTRICT WHERE POPPY WAS AUTHORIZED AS OF 1967, PLUS ONE
POWER MEGAPHONE TO ADDRESS FARMERS.

3. UN MIGHT WELL ASK GOT TO SURVEY HOW MANY OF THESE

VEHICLES ARE STILL OPERATIONAL AND TO CONSIDER FEASIBILITY ASSIGNING TO TMO IN EACH OF THE 51 KAZAS OR DISTRICTS WHERE

WHERE POPPY PRODUCTION HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR 1975. THESE VEHICLES WOULD BE USED FOR INSPECTION DURING INCISION PERIOD AND DURING STRAW HARVEST FOR PICKING UP CROP. FOLLOWING THIS THEY COULD BE RETURNED TO THE DISTRICTS WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED.

4. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF LOAN, TNP ESTABLISHED CENTRAL NARCOTIC OFFICE AT ANKARA AND 32 FIELD OFFICES AT ANKARA, ISTANBUL AND IZMIR AND 29 PROVINCIAL CITIES IN TRADITIONAL POPPY GROWING REGIONS. TNP WAS PROVIDED 92 VEHICLES FOR THESE UNITS PLUS RADIO BASE STATIONS AND MOBILE RADIOS FOR EACH VEHICLE. ABOUT 84 PORTABLE HAND RADIOS WERE FURNISHED. TNP BETWEEN 1969 AND 1971 ASSIGNED 420 MEN TO THESE UNITS. LAW ENFORCEMENT EQUIPMENT FURNISHED INCLUDED REVOLVERS, BINOCULARS, FLASHLIGHTS, POLAROID CAMERAS, SHOTGUNS, SUBMACHINE GUNS, POWER MEGAPHONES, VEHICLE SIRENS AND RED LIGHTS, FOUR 8MM MOTION PICTURE CAMERAS AND PROJECTORS. EQUIPMENT PACKAGE WAS DESIGNED TO GIVE TNP THE TRANSPORT AND FIREARMS NECESSARY TO INVESTIGATE MAJOR TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS AND RAID ILLICIT LABORATORIES AND NARCOTICS CACHES WHICH THEY HAD HERETOFORE BEEN UNABLE TO DO. PRIOR TO ORGANIZING THESE UNITS IN 1969 TURKEY NEVER HAD A PERMANENTLY ORGANIZED NARCOTIC ENFORCEMENT UNIT OR EVEN A SINGLE PERSON ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO NARCOTIC ENFORCEMENT.

5. JANDARMA IN ADDITION TO ESTABLISHING CENTRAL NARCOTIC OFFICE IN ITS HEADQUARTERS AT ANKARA, ORGANIZED 28 FIELD OFFICES AT PROVINCIAL CAPITALS IN TRADITIONAL POPPY GROWING AREAS. JANDARMA WAS PROVIDED 66 FOUR WHEEL DRIVE PERSONNEL CARRIERS FOR ASSIGNMENT TO ANKARA HQS. AND FIELD UNITS. THREE SPOTTER AIRCRAFT WERE PROVIDED PLUS THREE FOUR WHEEL DRIVE PICKUP TRUCKS TO PROVIDE MOBILE SUPPORT TO AIRCRAFT. JANDARMA ASSIGNED 330 MEN TO PROGRAM. CONFIDENTIAL

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JANDARMA AND TNP PROVINCIAL UNITS WERE EACH ASSIGNED TEN MEN AND TWO VEHICLES. JANDARMA UNITS WERE ALSO PROVIDED REVOLVERS, HANDCUFFS, FLASHLIGHTS, SHOTGUNS, SUBMACHINE GUNS, POWER MEGAPHONES, FLARE GUNS, POLAROID CAMERAS, VEHICLE SIRENS AND RED LIGHTS. JANDARMA VEHICLES WERE EQUIPPED WITH RADIOS. BASE RADIO STATIONS WERE PROVIDED FOR ANKARA AND EACH PROVINCIAL NARCOTIC HEADQUARTERS. MOBILE RADIOS WERE ALSO FURNISHED TO PROVIDE FIXED AND MOBILE COMMUNICATION WITH THREE JANDARMA AIRCRAFT.

6. HISTORICALLY, TNP HAS NEVER BEEN INVOLVED IN OPIUM POPPY CONTROL AT FARM LEVEL AND THROUGHOUT RURAL AREA. FOLLOWING REORGANIZATION AND EQUIPPING OF FIELD UNITS

FROM 1969 THROUGH 1974, TNP PERFORMANCE HAS IMPROVED BUT STILL HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETELY ADEQUATE TO DATE. URGENT NEED EXISTS FOR TNP REVITALIZE ITS DOMESTIC NARCOTIC ENFORCEMENT EFFORT AND ITS COOPERATIVE EFFORTS WITH FOREIGN COUNTERPART AGENCIES, PARTICULARLY IN WESTERN EUROPE WHERE COUNTERPARTS REGARD TNP LESS THAN EFFECTIVE AND UNRESPONSIVE.

7. JANDARMA HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR ERADICATION OF ILLICIT POPPY CULTIVATION AND INTERDICTION OF OPIUM AND MORPHINE BASE IN TURKISH INTERIOR. IT HAS FOR OVER 20 YEARS CENTERED ITS NARCOTIC CONTROL COMMAND IN ITS HEAD-QUARTERS INTELLIGENCE CENTER AT ANKARA AND IT IS KNOWN TO HAVE EXCELLENT INTELLIGENCE GRASP OF ILLICIT PRODUCTION DIVERSION AND TRAFFIC INCLUDING SUSPECT AREAS, INDIVIDUALS AND ROUTES. HOWEVER, DUE TO COMBINATION OF AN UNCERTAIN MANDATE ON HOW AGGRESSIVE IT SHOULD BE AND LACK OF FIELD ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT PRIOR TO 1971, JANDARMA NARCOTIC CONTROL ACTIVITY WAS INADEQUATE. JANDARMA INTELLIGENCE UNDERSTANDABLY HAS BEEN BASED MORE ON MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CONCEPTS THAN CRIMINAL AND HAS TENDED TO BE STRATEGIC RATHER THAN TACTICAL. IN ADDITION TO LACKING OVERALL GOOD ACTIONABLE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE JANDARMA HAS NOT BEEN ORIENTED TO TRANSLATING TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE INTO TANGIBLE OPERATIONAL RESULTS IN WAY OF NARCOTIC ARRESTS AND SEIZURES.

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8. INCREASING REPORTS ARE BEING RECEIVED THAT JANDARMA IS NOT EFFECTIVELY UTILIZING ITS MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AIRCRAFT TO DETECT AND ERADICATE POPPY CULTIVATION IN TOKAT, AMASYA, CORUM, MALATYA, ADIYAMIN AND ELAZIG, AND FURTHER EAST IN VAN-DIYARBAKIR AREA, WHERE WE HEAR POPPIES ARE BEING GROWN ILLICITLY. NOW JANDARMA WILL HAVE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITY TO ERADICATE UNLICENSED CULTIVATION IN AUTHORIZED PROVINCES AND PREVENT VIA MOBILE PATROLS, ILLICIT DIVERSION AND INTERDICTION OVER ROADS AND HIGHWAYS ANY OPIUM PRODUCED BY ILLICIT INCISION.

9. TRADITIONALLY, JANDARMA HAS NEVER INVOLVED ITSELF IN INSPECTING OR CONTROLLING LICENSED POPPY CULTIVATION. THIS WAS LEFT EXCLUSIVELY TO TMO AND MIN. AGRICULTURE OFFICIALS. JANDARMA DID NOT INVOLVE ITSELF IN OPIUM CONTROL UNTIL OPIUM WAS OR WAS ABOUT TO BE DIVERTED TO ILLICIT TRAFFIC BY GROWER. ON THIS SCORE, RECORD INDICATES JANDARMA WAS NOT EFFECTIVE. GIVEN ENORMITY OF DIVERSION, JANDARMA SEEMED TO STAND BY ON SIDELINES UNTIL OPIUM MOVED INTO BLACK MARKET. ITS PATROLS AND INVESTIGATIONS

TO PREVENT DIVERSION IN VILLAGES AUTHORIZED TO CULTIVATE

WERE PRACTICALLY NON-EXISTENT AND EFFORTS TO RAID CACHES OF OPIUM KNOWN TO EXIST IN VILLAGES WERE UNAGGRESSIVE AND OVER-CAUTIOUS. JANDARMA NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SINCE 1971 IT HAS HAD MANPOWER, MOTOR TRANSPORT, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, FIREARMS AND AIRCRAFT TO MOUNT EFFECTIVE ROAD-BLOCK OPERATIONS DURING CRUCIAL HARVEST AND DELIVERY PERIOD, HAS NEVER DONE SO.

10. BOTH TNP AND JANDARMA MAINTAIN CENTRAL NARCOTIC OFFICE SEPARATELY IN ONE BUILDING COMPLEX AT ANKARA. EACH CENTRAL OFFICE IS BUILT AROUND NEED OF ORGANIZATION IT SERVES. WHILE JURISDICTIONS OVERLAP, THEY ARE ALSO QUITE SEPARATE AND IT IS LIKELY, NOTWITHSTANDING ANY AGREEMENT TO ORGANIZE A COMBINED INTELLIGENCE CENTER, BOTH TNP AND JANDARMA WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN SEPARATE CENTRAL NARCOTIC OFFICES AND INTELLIGENCE CENTERS. WHILE COMBINED INTELLIGENCE CENTER WOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE STEP, FOR 1975, IF BOTH TNP AND JANDARMA IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR CURRENT CENTRAL NARCOTIC OFFICE AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
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CAPABILITY DIVERSION AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC SUPPRESSION EFFORT WOULD BE GREATLY ENHANCED. BOTH SERVICES SHOULD USE WHAT THEY NOW HAVE ON LINE AND IF UNIFIED INTELLIGENCE IS AGREED UPON, DEVELOP IT ASAP.

11. HOWEVER, IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER, CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN TO AVOID TENDENCY TO DO NOTHING UNTIL ALL EQUIPMENT IS RECEIVED. THIS COULD BE FATAL TO 1975 PROGRAM AND DOUBLY DISAPPOINTING SINCE JANDARMA AND TNP ALREADY HAVE ORGANIZED AND EQUIPPED NARCOTIC UNITS IN PLACE WHICH IF PROPERLY LED AND MOTIVATED CAN BE EFFECTIVE IN PREVENTING DIVERSION AND SUPPRESSING ILLICIT TRAFFIC.

12. TRADITIONALLY, AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AGENTS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR LICENSING AND INSPECTION OF POPPY CULTIVATION IN TURKEY AND AT HARVEST FARMERS WERE REQUIRED TO DELIVER THEIR CROP TO TMO SOIL PRODUCTS OFFICES OF MINISTRY OF COMMERCE. NOW TMO HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH LICENSING AND INSPECTION RESPONSIBILITY BUT WITH LIMITED MANPOWER AND FIELD STAFF MUST DEPEND GREATLY ON MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND ITS FIELD FORCE.

13. A FAILURE OF THE SYSTEM TO LICENSE POPPY CULTIVATION PRIOR TO THE 1972 CROP WAS THAT LAW DID NOT PERMIT GOT TO DENY LICENSE TO ANYONE TO LIMIT PRODUCTION OVERALL OR

LIMIT IT TO CERTAIN AREAS OR PROVINCES FOR CONTROL AND

SECURITY PURPOSES. LAW ENACTED FINALLY IN 1971 AND IMPLEMENTED IN 1972 PROVIDED FOR THIS. HOWEVER, FOR 1975, SINCE

REPORTS INDICATE GOT ISSUED OVER 100,000 LICENSES, WE ARE NOT CERTAIN WHETHER ANYONE WAS DENIED LICENSE. FAILURE TO RESTRICT LICENSES TO OR NEAR ORIGINAL ESTIMATES OF 70,000 RAISES QUESTION OF ABILITY OF TMO TO RESTRICT FARMERS TO SIZE OF PLOTS LICENSED. IF COMBINED TMO/MINAG INSPECTIONS UNCOVER OVERAGE ON FARM QUERY WILL THEY ERADICATE IT OR OVERLOOK IT. HISTORICALLY, LICENSED CULTIVATORS HAVE NEVER BEEN HELD CLOSELY ACCOUNTABLE AND OVERAGES HAVE NEVER BEEN ERADICATED. UNLICENSED CULTIVATION IN AUTHORIZED GROWING AREAS WAS ALSO OVERLOOKED. ERADICATION WAS CONFIDENTIAL

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NORMALLY CARRIED OUT ONLY IN AREAS WHERE CULTIVATION WAS PROHIBITED AND EVEN THERE, PROGRAM WAS SPORADIC AND POORLY ORGANIZED.

POPPY CONTROL CHECK LIST

14. THE IDEAL SITUATION IN TURKEY WOULD BE A CZAR WITH AUTHORITY TO COMMAND REGULATORY CROP CONTROL AND DELIVERY AS WELL AS JANDARMA AND TNP IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE ROLES. SECOND CHOICE WOULD BE ONE INDIVIDUAL COMMANDING REGULATORY CONTROLS FROM TMO OR MIN. AGRICULTURE AND COUNTERPART COMMANDING JANDARMA/TNP EFFORT TO PREVENT DIVERSION AND SUPPRESS ILLICIT TRAFFIC. AS THIS ALSO UNLIKELY, FOR 1975 IT MIGHT BE BEST TO GO WITH EXISTING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. WHILE TMO MAY ASSUME DIRECTION OF REGULATORY EFFORT QUESTION REMAINS ON BUREAUCRATIC LINES HOW EFFECTIVELY TMO WILL BE ABLE TO ENLIST PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT RESOURCES OF MIN. AGRICULTURE IT ABSOLUTELY NEEDS. THIS ESSENTIALLY BOILS DOWN TO CRITICAL NEED FOR AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AGENTS AND VEHICLES PROVIDED FOR POPPY CONTROL BETWEEN 1970 AND 1974 THROUGH U.S. AID PROJECT LOAN 277-H-086.

15. ABILITY OF TMO-MINAG INSPECTION TEAMS TO ENSURE CULTIVATION COMPLIES WITH LICENSE AND THAT OVERAGES ARE ERADICATED OR OTHERWISE PROPERLY ADMINISTERED WILL BE KEY TO PREVENTING DIVERSION.

16. AGRICULTURAL TECHNICIANS MUST BE PREPARED TO PREDICT INCISION PERIOD BEGINNING IN BURDUR, ISPARTA, KONYA AND DENIZLI, FOLLOWED BY USAK, AFYON AND KUTAHYA. ACCURATE OF BOTH AGRICULTURAL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES AT POINTS WHERE THEY CAN BE MOST EFFECTIVE. FOR THIS PURPOSE, GOT SHOULD CONFIRM HOW MANY AGRICULTURAL INSPECTORS IT PLANS TO ASSIGN AND HOW MANY OF THE 150-FOUR WHEEL DRIVE PICKUPS WILL BE ALLOCATED.

17. WHAT WILL BE THE REQUIREMENT FOR LICENSE HOLDERS TO TURN IN STRAW. WHAT IF FARMER INCISES ALL HIS POPPY AND TURNS IN NO STRAW WITH STATEMENT STRAW CROP FAILED.

IF GROWER EXTRACTS SEED, CUTTING POD TO DO SO CAN BE USED
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TO OBLITERATE INCISIONS TO EXTRACT GUM. GOT HAS MENTIONED
FINAL INSPECTION BEFORE PERMITTING POPPY HARVEST TO PRE-
VENT INCISION FOR GUM. ROUGH ESTIMATE INDICATES DURING
ONE MONTH PERIOD, POPPY IS HARVESTED FROM BURDUR TO KONYA
OVER 100,000 PLOTS WOULD HAVE TO BE INSPECTED. HOW WILL
THIS BE DONE. HOW MUCH MANPOWER AND HOW MANY VEHICLES
WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THIS.

18. AS AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP, THE JANDARMA SHOULD
REPORT MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT DISPOSITIONS IT HAS ASSIGNED
IN SEVEN PROVINCES UNDER CULTIVATION. THIS SHOULD
INCLUDE SEVEN UNITS OF TEN MEN EACH, FULLY TRAINED AND
EQUIPPED INCLUDING 14 FOUR WHEEL DRIVE PERSONNEL CARRIERS
BASE AND MOBILE RADIOS SUPPORTED BY THREE AIRCRAFT.
JANDARMA SHOULD ALSO REPORT HOW MANY OTHER RADIO EQUIPPED
NARCOTIC CONTROL VEHICLES IT PLANS TO ASSIGN TO GROWING
AREA DURING CRUCIAL INCISION AND POPPY HARVEST PERIOD,
AND HOW MANY MEN.

19. JANDARMA APPARENTLY HAS MANPOWER VEHICLES AND AIR-
CRAFT TO PREVENT ILLICIT INCISIONS IF MANDATED TO DO SO
AND PROVIDED FUNDS AVAILABLE TO MANEUVER MANPOWER AND
EQUIPMENT RESOURCES FOR CRUCIAL INCISION PERIOD OF FOUR TO
SIX WEEKS TO PREVENT ILLICIT INCISION.

20. BASIC IS DAWN TO DUSK AIR PATROL BY SPOTTERS AIR-
CRAFT NOW IN JANDARMA INVENTORIES PLUS UTILIZATION OF
10 TO 20 FIXED WING SPOTTER AIRCRAFT AND/OR HELICOPTERS
IN TURK ARMY INVENTORY. DURING CRITICAL PERIOD, EVERY
AVAILABLE NARCOTIC VEHICLES SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO SEVEN
PROVINCE GROWING AREA AND APPROXIMATE 270 JANDARMA TROOPS
IN THOSE PROVINCES SHOULD BE APPROPRIATELY AUGMENTED TO
PROVIDE DAWN TO DUSK PATROLS TO RESPOND TO AIRCRAFT DIS-
COVERIES OF FARMERS INCISING AND FOR CONSTANT SHOW OF
FORCE ON GROUND THROUGH MOTOR VEHICLE PATROLS TO PREVENT
INCISION AND FOR WELL ORGANIZED VIGOROUSLY IMPLEMENTED
ROADBLOCKS TO INTERDICT DIVERTED OPIUM AND SEIZED DIVERTED
OPIUM STOCKPILES CACHED IN VILLAGES. CONSTANT WELL
ORGANIZED, VERY VISIBLE AIR AND GROUND PATROLS WILL BE
KEY TO PREVENTING ILLICIT INCISION OF POPPY AND OPIUM
EXTRACTION AND TRAFFIC. FAILING THIS, THE ABILITY TO
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IDENTIFY MIDDLEMEN BUYERS, MAJOR ILLICIT TRAFFICKERS,
MORPHINE BASE PRODUCERS AND THEIR LABORATORIES OFFER BEST
DEFENSE AGAINST SIGNIFICANT ILLICIT TRAFFIC MOVING TO

EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA. DEVELOPMENT OF SOURCES BY JANDARMA AND TNP WHO CAN PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION IS IMPERATIVE. PRIMARY IN THIS IS FOR JANDARMA AND TNP TO HAVE FUNDING TO PAY REWARDS FOR THIS INFORMATION. GOT HAS NEVER SUPPLIED THIS WHILE OTHER LEGAL OPIUM PRODUCERS TRADITIONALLY HAVE. DEA IS PREPARED SUPPLY UP TO \$80,000

FOR THIS PURPOSE, UNDER APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS. GOT DOES NORMALLY PAY REWARDS FOR INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION LEADING TO ARRESTS AND SEIZURES.

21. USING INTELBIGENCE CANCEPT TO PINPOINT ILLICIT INCISION IN GROWING REGION WILL BE CHALLENGING AND MAY TAKE MUCH TIME TO PERFECT AND, UNTIL INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY IS DEVELOPED MOST EFFECTIVE PREVENTION MEASURE AGAINST ILLICIT INCISION LIKELY TO BE CONSTANT DAWN TO DUSK GROUND AND AIR PATROLS DURING CRUCIAL INCISION PERIOD. IF IT PROVES IMPOSSIBLE BEFORE 1975 HARVEST TO ESTABLISH EXTENSIVE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK, TNP AND JANDARMA MIGHT BEST ALLOCATE INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR 1975 TO TRACKING MOVEMENT OF OPIUM MIDDLEMEN, OPERATING IN PROVINCIAL CITIES, MAJOR TRAFFICKERS THEY SERVICE, MORPHINE BASE LABORATORY OPERATORS AND MOVEMENT OF OPIUM AND MORPHINE BASE. BULK OF VIOLATORS INVOLVED IN THIS ACTIVITY ARE WELL KNOWN AND FULLY DOCUMENTED TO JANDARMA AND TNP. PROBLEM IS SURVEILLING AND DEVELOPING EVIDENCE AGAINST THESE VIOLATORS AND POOR COOPERATION BETWEEN JANDARMA AND TNP.

22. JANDARMA MIGHT IN ADDITION TO PATROLS TO PREVENT ILLICIT INCISION, UTILIZE MOBILE ROADBLOCK TECHNIQUE AND CONSTANT VILLAGE PATROLS TO DETECT MORPHINE BASE LABORATORIES. AIRCRAFT COULD ALSO BE USEFUL FOR THIS. TNP MIGHT CONCENTRATE ITS EFFORT ON ACTIVE OPIUM MIDDLEMEN OPERATIONS IN PROVINCIAL CAPITOLS AND DISTRICT CENTER S, IDENTIFY MAJOR TRAFFICKERS OR MORPHINE LABORATORIES THEY MAY SUPPLY AND WORK WITH JANDARMA TO INTERCEPT OPIUM AND BASE TRAFFIC.

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23. AT ISTANBUL, IZMIR, ANKARA, GAZIANTEP, ADANA AND ISKENDERUN, TNP MUST INCREASE SURVEILLANCE AND INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES AGAINST TRAFFICKING GROUPS INVOLVED IN MORPHINE TRAFFIC TO WESTERN EUROPE. THIS FOR PURPOSE OF EFFECTING ARRESTS AND SEIZURES IN TURKEY OR TRANSMITTING VIA TNP ANKARA INTERPOL RADIO STATION INFORMATION TO WESTERN EUROPE WHICH WILL LEAD TO NARCOTIC ARRESTS AND SEIZURES.

24. TNP PARTICULARLY AT ISTANBUL SHOULD DEVELOP CANDID AND MEANINGFUL BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH POLICE IN AUSTRIA, F.R. GERMANY, ITALY, FRANCE, SWITZERLAND, HOLLAND, BELGIUM, DENMARK, SWEDEN, YUGOSLAVIA AND BULGARIA. UN REP MAY BE

ABLE TO PROMOTE INVITATION FOR NARCOTIC ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS OF THOSE COUNTRIES VISIT ISTANBUL AND ANKARA TO DEVELOP BETTER COOPERATIVE RELATIONS.

25. IN ADDITION TO BILATERAL MEETINGS AT ANKARA AND ISTANBUL, UNFDAC MAY WISH ORGANIZE MEETING OF THOSE COUNTRIES AT ISTANBUL TO FURTHER REGIONAL COOPERATION. GREECE AND ROMANIA MIGHT ALSO BE INVITED.

26. REQUEST OF GOT FOR 75 FOUR-WHEEL DRIVE VEHICLES COULD ENHANCE POPPY CONTROL AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC SUPPRESSION DURING 1975. IF VEHICLES CAN ARRIVE IN TIME AND ARE EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED, TMO AND AGRICULTURE CAN USE VEHICLES TO AUGMENT THOSE CURRENTLY AVAILABLE FOR CROP INSPECTIONS. JANDARMA COULD DO LIKEWISE. JANDARMA ORGANIZATION COMMUNICATION NETWORK AND TRANSPORT SERVICE FACILITIES IN SEVEN PROVINCES AREA CAN EASILY ASSIMILATE AND PLACE RADIO EQUIPPED VEHICLES IN OPERATION TO WORK WITH AIRCRAFT IN INCISION PREVENTION PATROLS. PORTION OF VEHICLES COULD BE ASSIGNED TO ELEMENTS OF JOINT INTELLIGENCE UNIT IF IT IS ESTABLISHED. ASAP JANDARMA SHOULD PROVIDE PLANS FOR OPERATIONAL USE OF ITS AIRCRAFT AND PLANS FOR AUGMENTATION OF ITS AIR PROGRAM WITH SPOTTER AIRCRAFT OR HELICOPTERS OR COMBINATION OF BOTH FROM TURK ARMY. IF THIS AUGMENTATION NOT ENOUGH, CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO PURCHASE OR CHARTER OF CESSNA 180 TYPE AIRCRAFT FOR FERRY FLIGHT DELIVERY TO TURKEY. HELIO STOL AIRCRAFT AND PIPER EARLIER
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PROVIDED JANDARMA WERE FLOWN FROM CONUS TO ANKARA. CONSIDERATION MIGHT ALSO BE GIVEN TO CHARTERING THIS TYPE AIRCRAFT IN WESTERN EUROPE. WHILE GOT HAS INDICATED AN INTEREST IN HELICOPTERS FOR SPOTTING AND INCISION PREVENTION, FIXED WING LIGHT AIRCRAFT ARE MORE EFFECTIVE FOR SPOTTING. THEY ARE FASTER, HAVE GREATER RANGE AND CAN STAY AIRBORNE LONGER. THEY ALSO COST LESS AND REQUIRE LESS DOWN TIME FOR SERVICING AND MAINTENANCE. TURKISH ARMY SHOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE PERSONNEL CARRIER HELICOPTERS FOR JANDARMA SHOULD THIS BACKUP TO SPOTTER AIRCRAFT AND JANDARMA GROUND TRANSPORT BE NEEDED.

27. WHILE NARCOTIC ENFORCEMENT TRAINING PROGRAMS OFFERED BY DEA AND UN DND SHOULD CONTINUE AND ARE USEFUL, IMPACT IS MORE LIKELY TO BE LONG-RANGE AND CONTRIBUTION TO PREVENTING OPIUM DIVERSION AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN 1975 NOT MUCH. SINCE DECEMBER 1972, DEA HAS HELD TEN TWO-WEEK

SCHOOLS IN TURKEY AND TRAINED 177 TNP AND 181 JANDARMA. AT SIX-WEEK DEA NARCOTIC OFFICER SUPERVISORY SCHOOL AT WASHINGTON, 12 TNP AND 7 JANDARMA HAVE BEEN TRAINED. UNFDAC MIGHT CONSIDER SENDING TNP TYPES TO WESTERN EUROPE FOR ON-JOB OR CROSS TRAINING AND JANDARMA TYPES TO IRAN,

ITALY OR FRANCE FOR ON-JOB TRAINING WITH COUNTERPARTS.
UN REP MAY WISH TO ENSURE TMO, JANDARMA AND TNP HAVE
APPROPRIATE FUNDS FOR TRAVEL AND PER DIEM FOR PERSONNEL
UTILIZED IN MOBILE POPPY CROP AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC CONTROL.
UN MAY ALSO WISH TO ENSURE FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE TO MEET
FUEL, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATING COST OF VEHICLES AND
AIRCRAFT PROVIDED.

28. IN VIEW OF TIMING FACTOR, UN REP MAY ALSO WISH TO
ENSURE THAT PRIOR TO FINALIZING PROCUREMENT ORDER FOR
EQUIPMENT, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS DECREES NECESSARY CUSTOMS
CLEARANCES. INGERSOLL

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, DRUG CONTROL, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, POLICIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 12 FEB 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: greeneet
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE031503
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: DEA:JCUASC:DEMILLER:BB
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D750050-0460
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750287/baaaagqk.tel
Line Count: 447
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN DEAE
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: greeneet
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 24 JUN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <24 JUN 2003 by KelleyW0>; APPROVED <03 NOV 2003 by greeneet>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: SNAR, TU, US, UN
To: GENEVA INFO ANKARA
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006